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THE PRESIDENT AS POLITICAL LEADER
A perceptive student of the Presidency, observing the gaps between presidential
policy and their congressional incidence, has stated that "the steady climb of the
Presidency in the matter of public policy leadership is one of the patent political
truths of the century. This rise has not been accompanied by a corresponding ex-
pansion of presidential authority as a party leader."' This statement about the gap
between these two roles of the President may be taken as not untypical of relation-
ships among other presidential roles.
It has been said many times, and cogently reiterated recently by Louis Brownlow2
and Clinton Rossiter, a that the Presidency is a position with many roles. As testi-
mony to the expansion of presidental roles, Brownlow, writing in 1949, delineated
some seven roles, and Rossiter, writing in 1956, described some nine. It is in terms
of the dynamics of these roles that the Presidency can be best understood.
Presidential roles are at once conflicting and complementary. The power of the
President in foreign relations has given weight to the President's recommendations
as an economic architect, viz., recent policies for the tightening of credit. Recom-
mendations on such domestic matters as school aid are bolstered by claiming their
efficacy in our rivalry with Russia. The President's role as communicator with the
public adds force to his role in foreign affairs, and vice versa. When the President
speaks as a legislative leader his voice is heard more fully because he has the
weapons to exert influence over his party.
The weaving of the strengths in the various roles is one of the tests of the
political skills of a President.' The President who can skillfully employ influence
derived in one role to fortify another zone of presidential competence demonstrates a
quality indispensable to broad-gauge leadership.
An expanding office is characterized by role-conflicts. Our recent Presidents have
exhibited many such instances. Thus, for example, President Roosevelt's proposals
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for executive reorganization in 1938 were an outgrowth of an awareness that a
burgeoning and uncoordinated executive establishment was incompatible with the
President's executive and legislative roles, among others. When Truman discovered
that the counsels of some of his lieutenants in the executive establishment were
compromising his role as chief executive, he confronted an almost classic role conflict
among our chief executives.6 President Eisenhower's reluctance to "take on" Senator
McCarthy was an attempt to minimize a conflict between his role as chief executive
and his role as party leader.
The problem of role-integration in the Presidency is exacerbated by the variety
of pressures that impinge upon the office.
7
For each of the President's multiple roles a matching force in his immediate vicinity
wanted him to concentrate on that one role and no other. The McAdoos, with their
absorbing interest in California's federal judgeships, were duplicated in other persons
whose absorbing interest was the farmer, or the laborer, or the big and little businessmen,
or the ground forces, the naval forces, the air forces, the Latin Americans, the English,
the Russians, the French, the Chinese, the enemy, the neutral powers, and on and on
through all the list of things that make the globe.8
This variety of pressures has been more responsible than any other factor for the
loose-jointed character of the President's relationships. The President's relationship
with his own executive establishment is a struggle of executive program coordina-
tion against what Leiper Freeman has called "creeping pluralism."9 The President
finds himself with expanding roles that are little more than opportunities to create
the influence necessary to their fulfillment.
Presidents have certain techniques for resolving role-conflicts 9 One technique
for resolving these jurisdictional conflicts is to erect a system of priorities. Thus,
Roosevelt appeared to give greater weight to public approbation than he did to
administrative "success." Agencies might be locked in overlapping struggles to the
distraction of harassed administrators, yet FDR was inclined to regard this as
secondary if the public received the program favorably. Role-conflicts may also be
resolved by established "rules of the game" or, to use another phrase, "political eti-
quettes." The claim of a senator for a favored piece of patronage is such an
etiquette that helps the President resolve rival patronage pressures. Role-conflicts
may be resolved by tact and diplomacy. Presidential aides often serve as polite
buffers. People are shunted aside, are given tactful dismissals and diplomatic
"brush offs."
'I HARRY S. TRUMAN, MEMOIRS 227-29 (1955).
7 DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS C. 13 (1951).
8 MARRINER S. ECCLES, BECKONING FRONTIERS 331 (1951).
'On this point, see the recent analytical summary by J. LEIPER FREEMAN, THE POLInCAL PROCESS;
EXECUTnVE BUREAU: LEGISLAIVE Co nrraE RELATIONS esp. c. 3 (1955).
" Recently a colleague and this writer conducted an attitude analysis of expectations of leadership.
A list of some fifty presidential role-conflict situations was compiled characteristic of the experiences
of our recent Presidents. Some of these role-conflicts were simple ones between two roles. Others were
multiple conflicts in which several areas of presidential competence were locked in critical choices. The
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Role-segregation is another method. Thus, Eisenhower, to a greater extent than
any previous President, has delegated his duties to particular cabinet members and
to members of his staff. The President thereby relieves himself of the pressures of
one of his roles. Among other familiar techniques that our Presidents have em-
ployed are the following: playing off one group against another to mitigate clashing
demands of each; "stalling" until the pressure subsides; resolving conflicts by re-
defining roles; leading a "double life." To sum up, there are more or less insti-
tutionalized techniques for preventing or diminishing role-conflicts." Nonetheless,
the dynamics of presidential roles proceed at a faster rate than the techniques for
their management.
Role-conflicts are characteristic in the unintegrated system that are presidential
relationships. The power of the President rests upon and takes place within certain
institutionalized frameworks, but presidential influence, in contrast to presidential
power, is something the President himself must create. Within the circumference of
historical expectations of presidential conduct, there are wide areas where the grooves
of behavior are ambiguous. In this area, the President is free to carve out for
himself, through his perceptions of his role and the practical limits of political
consensus, the paths he chooses to follow.
"To get any kind of measure enacted, the President has to build a special coalition
for the immediate object in view. Sometimes he can do this by reshuffling the forces
within his party. He can also pick up support from among the dissidents in the
opposition, or he can appeal directly to the nation in the hope that its groundswells
will override all party lines."' 2 The President's role as a party leader is, thus, at the
hub of his other roles.
A salient characteristic of these presidential roles is the extent to which their
fulfillment is contingent upon the activities of a staff and a burgeoning Executive
Office.'3 This office has been a product of the expanding roles of the President
and an important instrument for their integration. For, to a large measure, the
President imparts to his office his particular interpretation of the Presidency. The
Presidency today is an increasingly organizational product to which many contribute.
The processes we call presidential action are distilled from a myriad of organized
activities, formal and informal. We wish to discuss some aspects of the party leader-
ship role in this new organized face of the Presidency.
THE PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE AND THE WHITE HousE FACTION
The President rises to his position in varying degrees through the channels of a
" See L. J. Neiman and James W. Hughes, The Problem of the Concept of Role-A Resurney of the
Literature, 20 SociAl FORCES 141 (1952); Toby, Some Variables in Role-Conglict Analysis, 30 SOCIAL
FORcES 324 (1952); HAROLD D. LASSwELL, POWER AND PERSONALITY C. 2 (1948).
12S. HYMAN, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 53 (1954).
1 On developments of the Executive Office of the President, see EDWARD H. HosS, BEHIND THE
PRESIDENT (1954); F. M. MARX, THE PRESIDENT AND MS STAFF SERVICES (1947); B. P. NASH, STAFFIN O
THE PRESIDENCY (National Planning Ass'n Pamphlet No. 8o, 1952); the symposium of articles edited
by F. M. Marx, Federal Executive Reorganization Re-examined: . Symposium, in 4o AM. POL. SCI.
REv. 1124 (r946).
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party organization. He must, at the least, even if he is an "outsider," receive his
party's nomination. 4 He enters the White House bringing with him a party com-
ponent which he has been chiefly instrumental in fashioning and vice versa. The
National Committee is headed by a National Chairman who is his appointee. The
staff of the national organization is usually an extension of his nominating and
election campaign organizations. He staffs his cabinet and top policy positions
with leading figures drawn both from his strong supporters and the rival factions
whose support must be won. Taken together with the President's staff and the
larger executive establishment, these constitute what may be called the party in the
Presidency. It is this presidential party which has gained ascendancy over the legisla-
tive branch. It has also served as the cutting edge of a presidential program' 5 and
as an important contributor working toward the greater centralization of our parties.
Historically, Andrew Jackson transferred the leadership of the party away from
congressional leaders and placed it in the executive. The political nominating con-
ventions were an outgrowth of this assertion of presidential influence over the party
structure. Jackson's celebrated "kitchen cabinet" was a principal instrument in
effecting that change. For Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin D.
Roosevelt, the President's inner circle served as the core of the political party in
the executive.
With the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, this presidential inner circle
acquired increased importance. Under a President who was confronted with a
broad job of reconstruction in national crisis, the President's inner circle matured
as a flexible instrument of political leadership. 6
Since 1938, the presidential inner circles have been supplemented by a rapidly
growing institutionalized staff. New expectations of leadership in domestic areas
resulted in a vast expansion of the role of chief executive. In response to expanding
administrative agencies, the President needed, in Luther Gulick's phrase, more "func-
tional arms, legs, and eyes." The history and development of presidential reorgani-
zation is a subject of another essay in this symposium. The presidential staff, which
includes White House staff and the Executive Office of the President, now consists of
several thousand people.'7
The brain trust formed during Franklin D. Roosevelt's governorship was the
nucleus of a group later active in preparing the President-to-be for the campaign of
1932. Members of the same group continued as presidential intimates after Roose-
velt was inaugurated, though many were assigned formal positions in various de-
" DAVID P. AND R. GOLDNAN, PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING PATTERNS (1956).
1 E. P. HEiRING, PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP 24 (1940).
10 SAMUEL ROSENMAN, WORKING vITH ROOSEVELT (1952); RAYMOND MOLEY, AFTER SEVEN YEARS
(1939); JOSEPH ALsoP AND R. KNTNER, THE MEN AROUND THE PRESIDENT (1939); Tugwell, The
Preparation of a President, I W. PoL. Q. 131 (1948).
"' For the developments in White House staff organization, see Mr. Truman's White House, Fortune,
Feb. 1952, p. 74; Murphy, Eisenhower's White House, Fortune, July 1953, p. 75; Neustadt, Presidency
and Legislation, 48 Ame. POL. Sm. REV. 641 (i954).
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partments. In time, members of this presidential faction occupied positions in many
of the departments and, particularly, the new administrative agencies.
8
From the first, this group was in a restless harmony with James Farley and the
professional party politicians in Congress and on the state and local levels. In the
early years of the New Deal, the brain trust-politician relationship was somehow
maintained. With the Roosevelt second term, however, a new group, those his-
torically labeled the "New Dealers," took their places as the President's closest
advisers. This "group" included Ben Cohen, Tom Corcoran, the late Justice Jack-
son, and Harold Ickes, and many of the more intellectual additions to the federal
bureaucracy. It was allegedly while this group was influential that Roosevelt shifted
to the "left."
Opposition from Congress and party officials rose to new levels against this
group. Referring to these presidential aides, James Farley stated: "White House
confidence in politics and policies went to a small band of zealots, who mocked at
party loyalty and knew no devotion except unswerving obedience to their leader."'"
The matter may be said to have come to a head in the Supreme Court fight, a bill
which critically divided Roosevelt's party in Congress and alienated some of
Roosevelt's strong supporters. The cleavage was deepened by the ill-fated attempt
by Roosevelt to purge congressional and senatorial candidates in the bi-elections of
1938. This was a move allegedly counseled by this group and bitterly opposed by
Farley and the party professionals. The latter regarded it as a bold attempt to create
a personal party and a rude violation of political orthodoxy °
The 1938 purge attempt was an effort on the part of FDR to shape the Demo-
cratic Party in Congress in the image fashioned by him and the presidential faction.
By the election of 1940, the lines of cleavage were clearly drawn. While the mani-
fest issue appeared to be the legitimacy of a third term, the latent issue was the battle
between two centers of influence, the White House group now headed by Harry
Hopkins and the party professionals headed by Farley.2' The issue was thus truly
whether the presidential party in the White House would have the executive powers
plus Roosevelt's enormous popularity to reshape the party organization.
The onset of the war brought a truce, but the issue arose again in the election
of 1944. The battle over the vice-presidential candidates, Wallace and Truman, in
which Roosevelt played an evasive role, was interpreted as a retreat before the
mounting opposition to the New Dealers. With the mounting opposition in Con-
gress, Roosevelt became so discouraged over the prospect for reshaping the Demo-
cratic Party that in 1943, he entertained the idea of joining with Wendell Willkie to
create a new liberal party 2 Willkie's untimely death prevented any further de-
velopment. It was clear after Roosevelt's death that the Democratic Party had a new
is C. MICHELSON, THE GHOSTS TALKS 52 ff. (944).
'o JA.tEs FARLEY, Jim FARLEY'S STORY 68 (948).
2
°/d. at 147.
'1 ROBERT SHERxvOOD, ROOSEVELT AND HOPKINS 176-78 (948).
22 ROSENMIIAN, op. cit. supra note 16, at 386.
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wing-the New Dealers. These regarded themselves as the legatees of the New
Deal as represented by the Roosevelt program of 1935-38.
The preceding are only some highlights illustrative of the tension between
the presidential party and the party in Congress and the party on state and local
levels in the Roosevelt years. The tension was repeated with Truman. When
Truman ran on the Fair Deal program of 1948, he was essentially supported by his
presidential faction. It was they who fashioned the legislative program on which
he took his stand. It was they who urged him to fight when the leading party pro-
fessionals were abandoning him for a vote getter like Eisenhower.
In the Eisenhower administration, the role of the White House faction has
made itself strongly felt in party matters. Under the President's chief of staff,
Sherman Adams, party matters have come under close White House supervision.
It is evident that the split that prevailed in the Republican Party in 1952 between
Taft supporters and the Eisenhower supporters has continued. As long as Taft
was alive, this right wing was kept in reasonable harmony with the President. The
period of McCarthy's ascendancy marked a low point of Mr. Eisenhower's influence
in this party group.
In the elections in 1954, the President departed from his early pledge to keep
hands off the election and intervened on behalf of Republican candidates in senatorial
and congressional races. In the elections in November, the President's hand was
more strongly asserted on behalf of certain congressional and senatorial candidacies.23
Mr. Eisenhower would appear to be in a phase familiar to his two Democratic
predecessors. We know now (thanks to a recent account 24 ) that the President had
contemplated the abandonment of the Republican Party to embark upon a program
of refashioning it in the image of the presidential program. The dynamic conser-
vatism with which Mr. Eisenhower is identified has been fashioned and intellectual-
ized by the White House staff-notably its economists, Gabriel Hauge and Arthur
F. Burns.2 5 It has borrowed many a leaf from the New Deal policies of social
welfare and compensatory fiscal policy, coupled with a more cordial attitude toward
business interests.
Only a brief word is possible at this point about the other agencies of the Execu-
tive Office of the President. Historically, in this complex, the Bureau of the Budget,
OWMR, the Economic Adviser, and latterly, the National Security Council, have
played key roles. Their utility as devices for coordination does not concern us, but
their contribution toward mobilizing technical assistance for the President is a matter
of significance. These are agencies that operate in a political context and are not
immune from the tactical considerations that guide the President. Their party
significance lies perhaps in that they have become essential to the substantive pro-
" Notably in the senatorial races in Oregon and Washington, though differently in Wisconsin.
"' ROBERT J. DONOVAN, EISENHOWER: THE INSIDE STORY 151-53 (1955).
" It is significant that Mr. Arthur Larson, Undersecretary of Labor and the author of the widely
noted book on Eisenhower conservatism, has been pulled into the White House Staff.
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gram and administrative impact of the presidential party we have described.2 1 Col-
lectively, these new agencies represent an effort to raise to the highest level broad
policy considerations, 27 where the President may use his influence over Congress, his
party, or the people as a whole. "It is the power that lodges at low points in the
executive hierarchy that is hardest to bring to light and hold effectively account-
able"2 and where interest groups may enjoy their widest play.
THE PRESIDENT AND THE DECENTRALIZED PARTY
Not long ago, the delineation of our party system followed a familiar model.-D
The model was described in the following terms. The base of power in our parties
was in the states and localities. On this level, the political party was a political
machine organized hierarchically with a boss at its apex. The President and national
party apparatus played subordinate roles.
The changes of the past two decades have threatened this model with obsolescence.
There is a closure of the traditional gaps among state, local, and federal governments.
In a myriad of ways, some controlled and others uncontrolled, a creeping national-
ization has been taking place. The dynamic balance between state, local, and federal
government is being constantly altered. In this process, presidential action has been
both cause and effect. The impact of executive sponsored statutes and executive ad-
ministrative decisions of recent decades in making local matters of national concern,
and vice versa, is too obvious to repeat.
Inevitably, this has affected party structure and functioning in the states and
federal governmentY0
Between the state and local party organization and federal government is a close relation-
ship of interdependence. In the organization and spirit of their politics, the states vary
markedly. Their oddities and variations may be accounted for in part by the fact that
they are members of a federal system. The impact of national policies and parties
powerfully influence the form and behavior of state political systems. The manner in
which that impact strikes different states, differently constituted and situated contributes
to the variation in organization and conduct of state politics. 31
One index of change of the presidential role in state and local politics is reflected
in the changes in urban political machines. The decline of the large urban machines
is a symptom of the social changes we have indicatedV2 New Deal legislation was
.' Maass, In Accord With the Program of the President, in 0. J. FRIEDRICH AND J. K. GALBIRAITH
(EDs.), 4 PUBLIC POLICY (YEARBOOK o THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, HARVARD
UNIVERSITY) 77 (1953); HERMLALN SO MERS, PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY (195); W. Cikins, The Council of
Economic Advisers, in 4 PUBLIC POLICY, Op. cit. supra, at 94; Hood, Reorganizing the Council of
Economic Advisers, 69 POL. ScI. Q. 412 (1954).
" Seligman, Presidential Leadership: The Inner Circle and Institutionalization, 18 J. PoLITIcS 410
(956).
' D. K. Price, The Presidency, in STRENGTHENING AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS i08 (1949).
2 E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT (1942).
"0David B. Truman, Federalism and the Party System, in A. W. MACrmHON (ED.), FEDERALISM,
MATURE AND EMERGENT (1955).
"V. 0. KEY, AMERICAN STATE PoLIrICs 19-20 (1956).
"It would be premature to proclaim that the boss is extinct, for there is fresh evidence that new,
though limited, bosses are developing in some of our major metropolitan areas.
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responsible, both directly and indirectly, for undermining the position of the urban
machines. Voters have been liberated from their dependence upon paternalistic
local leaders as new legislation and federal administrative agencies have moved into
the areas impinging most closely on human welfareY3 What is evident is that state
and local party organization have been weakened 4 Interest groups, ardent amateurs
in political clubs, and public relations experts are tending to fill the vacuum of
political leadership and organization. Personal organizations created by candidates
are increasingly supplanting party organizations. Associated with this development,
a growing number of our national legislators are representatives of constituents with
social and economic interests that are more national and less sectional in scope, vide:
civil liberties, labor policy, education, social security 5 It may be suggested that because
of this, our legislators' involvement with a presidential program has increased. How-
ever, in those states where economies are less complex and major interests are few,
involvement with a presidential program is less, and White House pressure for
party voting is more precarious.
Governors and mayors rank high in influence within state and national party
organizations.38 While local orientations are deeply imbedded, these leaders, by and
large, often function more symbiotically with the President than do the national
legislators. The increased dependency of state governments and, particularly, metro-
politan areas, on federal largesse and administrative support, provides a strong link
of party influence.
The President has traditionally employed the techniques of persuasion, patronage
and "dealing" to build a congressional majority. Since Franklin D. Roosevelt, the
White House staff and informal advisers have worked on the Hill to guide legisla-
tion.37 When necessary, the President could tap his alliances with state and local
party organizations to apply pressure to recalcitrant congressmen and senators. This
technique was used largely in those states where a tight hierarchical party organiza-
tion prevailed.
A significant technique employed by the President is the appeal to the public
as a whole. So fluid has been our party discipline and identification that, paradox-
ically, the appeal by the President as a national leader is a major technique for
party discipline in Congress and in the states. In recent years, with the mounting
evidence of economic and cultural nationalization, this leadership technique has
special meaning. It is a way whereby the President may exploit national consensus,
sharpened by cold war tensions, to offset the particularism of legislators, while
23TRUMAN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 270-87 (1951).
3'M. MEYERSON AND E. C. BANFIELD, POLITICS, PLANNING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST C. II (955);
C. R. ADRIAN, GOVERNING URBAN AmERICA CC. 5, 6 (1955)-
"KEY, op. cit. supra note 31, at 26.
"Q Moos, New Light on the Nominating Process, in RESEARCH FRONTIERS IN POLITICS AND GOVERN-
MENT 148-55 (1955).
"'Mr. Eisenhower employs a principal staff assistant, General W. Persons, and his staff to maintain
active and regular liaison with Congress.
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weakened party organization and party identifications by the electorate38 can erect
fewer defenses against it.
THE PRESIDENT "ABOVE" PARTY
One of the dilemmas of the Presidency is that it is a position with two mandates,
one from a political party and another from the public-at-large. The fact that
each mandate is ambiguous creates at once leadership opportunities and complica-
tions.
The President's political party is at least nominally committed to mobilizing its
adherents on his behalf. The presidential electorate is always broader than the
steadfast party supporters0 9 In recent years, the presidential electorate has become
more fluid.4 The tides in voting behavior from Roosevelt through Eisenhower have
been variously analyzed. The social mobility in the postwar era to which we have
previously alluded has done much to dilute previous long standing group identifica-
tions.
Our recent Presidents, armed with newer weapons of mass communication, have
relied on methods that bypass party structures and appeal directly to the electorate.
All of our recent Presidents have found these methods efficacious. It is no exag-
geration to say that the President's most influential role and skill has become that
of a public communicator.' The technological revolution in the mass media-press,
radio, and television-coupled with the sophistication and professionalization of in-
sights into mass persuasion, have made possible an intensified relationship between
the President and the public. The organized character of this relationship is
one of the notable features of our politics. "President Roosevelt seems to have been
the first President ...to establish and utilize systematically and continuously an
elaborate organization designed to gauge public sentiment and world public opin-
ion."4 Because these set a pattern that other Presidents followed, they are worthy of
greater attention.
Like no President before him, Franklin D. Roosevelt developed a regular relation-
ship with the press. Sensitive to public opinion and conscious that a political
leader's strength is dependent upon his interaction with the public, Roosevelt vir-
tually "revolutionized the government relationship with the Press."43 The regular
give-and-take press conference was among his most important innovations. The
calculated timing of publicity, the planned "leak," and "straw in the wind" device,
were all methods which Roosevelt artfully employed.'
" See S. LUBELL, TiH REVOLT OF THE MODERATES (1955).
" "Prior to World War I presidential candidates usually received about five per cent more votes
than congressional candidates; since World War I the difference has risen to about twelve per cent."
Moos, supra note 36, at 17.
'A. CAMPBELL, D. GUERIN, AND W. MILLER, THE VOTER DECIDES (1953); S. LUBELL, THE FUTURE
OF AMERICAN POLIICS (951), and THE REVOLT OF THE MODERATES, Op. cit. supra note 38.
'1 W. F. BINKLEY, THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 248 (x947).
,2 See Brownlow's discussion, op. cit. supra note 2, c. 4.
'
5 Rosten, Political Leadership and the Press, in EssAYs IN HONOR OF CHARLES E. MERRIAM 94
(941).
"Readers would find illuminating FDR's discussion of public relations with his cabinet. See
PROCEEDINGS OF TIE NATIONAL EMERGENCY COUNCIL, 1933-1935 (U. S. Archives).
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The new press relationship created a new middleman technican between the
President and the public, the White House Press Secretary. "His unhappy job is
trying to keep the public, represented by the reporters and photographers, and
the President pacified and pleased. The right kind of twenty-four hour publicity on
everything a President does has become requisite to his political survival."45
The Press Secretary and his staff perform a variety of tasks for the President.
His strategic position and intimacy with the President give his job a free-wheeling
character. He is an important "buffer" for the President, as well as an important
liaison agent in the array of presidential relationships. His management of news
dissemination, institutionalized now in the regular press conference and public
addresses, give him an important voice in the timing and often in the content of
messages. Because he thinks in terms of "news" and of the President's interests, no
President can afford to ignore his counsel or fail to exploit his competence.
In the Eisenhower administration, James Hagerty, the Press Secretary, has
emerged as one of the key figures. He regularly attends cabinet meetings and plays
a leading role in the making of many political decisions. Some observers contend
that he has become a gatekeeper to all important communications that flow not
only from the White House, but from cabinet departments as well. Illustrative
of Mr. Hagerty's influence is his role in the two crises attendant upon the President's
illness. At a time of public anxiety, he became, in effect, the controlling voice of
the administration4
A measure of the personal identification between the President and the public
is given us by the volume of mail addressed to the President. Franklin D. Roose-
velt wanted the public to write him. "Throughout the Roosevelt administration
every day brought an average of more than five thousand letters a day.... In times
of great crisis, it would frequently be as much as twenty-five thousand a day for
a week."'47 Roosevelt had White House mail carefully tabulated "as an indicator of
what issues were most on the public mind."4 In several fireside chats, he encour-
aged mail barrages against Congress at critical moments in decisions on legisla-
tion.49 As a party weapon, this tactic was employed to light fires under congressional,
state, and local party leaders, to assert both his leadership of his party and his
leadership over party. The communication techniques that FDR refined and so
dramatically employed are institutionalized now by virtue of their continuation by
Truman and Eisenhower.
The President's personality has been split from his official acts. As a result,
greater expectations of presidential leadership have been stimulated.
James Reston recently reported:5°
" MERRIMAN SmITH, A PRESIDENT Is MANY MEN 86 ff. (1948).
"8 Deakin, Hagerty: Voice Behind the Throne, New Republic, Aug. 27, 1956, p. 7; Ike's Man
Jim Hagerty, Newsweek, Aug. 6, 1956, p. 23.
47 BROWNLOW, op. ct. supra note 2, at 70.
48 Sussman, FDR and the White House Mail, 20 PUB. OPINION Q. 9 (1956).
" ROSENMAN, op. cit. supra note 16, at 570, 428. " N. Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1955, § 4, p. 8E, col. 5.
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The popularity of President Eisenhower has got beyond the bounds of reasonable calcula-
tion and will have to be put down as a national phenomenon, like baseball.. . . Very
much against his will, the President is suddenly being presented as the answer and solu-
tion to everything-war, juvenile delinquency, the decline in farm prices, parental irre-
sponsibility, the division of Europe and Germany, polio, death on the highways, the school
shortage and the rest. When the Republican state chairmen met here this week, they
went over all these things and came to the same conclusion about everything. Ike was
the answer.
This technique has served to make the President a person "above" party. How-
ever, such elevation pushes party responsibility farther beyond reach. If the Presi-
dency relies too heavily on popular appeal, then party organization necessarily
becomes subordinated and weakened. We see, then, the trend toward the "per-
sonalization" of the Presidency as a threat to party organization.
This new dimension of presidential influence has opened a direct channel to
party adherents in the electorate that circumvents party organization. The middle-
man of party organization is being displaced by the direct communication possible
between the President and informal opinion leaders in the community who hold
no party posts. Frank Hague, in his days of power, reputedly once said that "Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt was the best precinct captain that he had." Hague's remark pithily
illustrates the point. The President can, through mass appeal, awaken and foster
new groups of party activists who oppose existing party organization.
A recent analysis of the Republican Party in Michigan describes the factional
conflict that has served to weaken the party.5 The factional splits revolve around
a new "self-starting" element that has arisen out of the intense "followership" of
President Eisenhower. These Eisenhower zealots challenged the existing organiza-
tion and are still locked in struggle with it.
Perhaps the most striking paradox of this new dimension of presidential influ-
ence is that it has grown simultaneously with the President's efforts and success in
crystallizing national issues for public debate. There is a fine line, easily traverscd,
between public education on issues and demagogic appeals. The power of the
mass media makes possible the projection of many types of address. Which aspect
of a message is most salient is partly a matter of audience predisposition and its
environment, and the purposes of the communicator. There are serious dangers
when, through mass manipulation, false expectations of leadership are generated.
We have attempted to place the President's party leadership role in the context
of its dynamic relationship to the President's other roles. We have considered the
growth in presidential influence as it has been augmented by the presidential
party in the executive, changes in state and local party organizations, and through
enhanced public response.
" Norton-Taylor, What's Wrong With Michigan, Fortune, Dec. j955, p. 142.
